

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2139
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION 1 OF 3 VICE 1 OF 2)

USCTB

LONDON PASS SECRETARY VANCE
PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:YGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET VIEWS ON MAJOR ISSUES

CTB MESSAGE NO.261

1. SUMMARY: AT REQUEST OF SOV DEL, WARNKE, JOHNSON AND
NEIDLE (US) MET ON JULY 14 WITH PETROSYANTS, TIMERBAEV
AND TARASOV (USSR). PETROSYANTS SAID HE WISHED TO CARRY
FORWARD FROM DISCUSSION OF VANCE AND GROMYKO IN MORE
DETAIL AND WITH PURPOSE OF SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO MAJOR
PROBLEMS. HE SAID MUCH GOOD SUBSTANTIVE WORK HAD BEEN
DONE; HE WANTED NOW TO ARRANGE AND EXPEDITE FUTURE WORK.
SPEAKING FROM PREPARED NOTES HE REVIEWED ALL MAJOR ISSUES,
STATING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD ACCEPT NSS, BUT

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SUGGESTING MODIFICATIONS OF US PROPOSALS. THIS CABLE
REPORTS SOVIET VIEWS AND SUMMARIZES DISCUSSION UNDER
EACH MAJOR ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

2. SCOPE OF TREATY. PETROSYANT SAID SOVIETS ARE IN
FAVOR OF A TOTAL BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS. THEY GAVE
US THEIR ARTICLE I MANY MONTHS AGO AND EXPECT US COM-

MENTS OR A US DRAFT ARTICLE IN THE NEAREST FUTURE. WITHOUT SOLVING PROBLEM OF SCOPE, PETROSYANTS COULDN'T IMAGINE HOW OTHER ISSUES COULD BE SOLVED. WARNKE COMMENTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD REITERATED HIS POSITION THAT THE US IS SEEKING A GENUINELY COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. US PRESS REPORTS DO REFLECT SOME DIFFERENCE OF OPINION, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THIS ISSUE. WE DID, OF COURSE, INFORM THE SOVIETS EARLIER THAT THERE WAS A SEPARATE QUESTION REGARDING CONDUCTING SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS, LIKE LASER FUSION, AND WE WOULD RETURN TO THIS LATER. PETROSYANTS SAID THE SOVIETS WERE NEVERTHELESS CONCERNED. ARTICLE I DETERMINED THE VERY SPIRIT OF THE TREATY. HE URGED THAT WE COME FORWARD WITH OUR TEXT FOR ARTICLE I IN THE NEAREST FUTURE. IF WE DID INTEND A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY, COULD WARNKE GIVE SOME IDEA OF WHAT TYPE OF ARTICLE WE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND. WARNKE SAID HE DID NOT FORESEE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN DRAFTING AN ARTICLE. IT WOULD JUST BE A QUESTION OF FINDING THE RIGHT LANGUAGE. ACTUALLY THE SOVIET PROPOSED ARTICLE USED THE SAME KEY PHRASE AS THE US DECEMBER 7 WORKING PAPER. BOTH OF THEM WERE SIMILAR TO THE 1963 LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY. PETROSYANTS SAID HE WISHED TO PURSUE THIS FURTHER AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

3. DURATION. PETROSYANTS RECALLED THAT WHEN US HAD PROPOSED A FIVE YEAR TREATY, SOVIET SIDE HAD INDICATED ITS
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INTENTION TO TAKE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE. BUT NOW US APPARENTLY HAD NO DEFINITE ATTITUDE AND US SIDE APPEARED TO WANT TO DECIDE BY ITSELF WHETHER TREATY SHOULD HAVE A DURATION OF FIVE OR THREE YEARS. THE QUESTION WAS OBVIOUSLY LINKED WITH OTHER ISSUES. THE SOVIETS HAD NO OBJECTION TO A REVIEW CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN THE LAST YEAR OF THE TREATY'S OPERATION. HOWEVER, THEY COULD NOT AGREE THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER TO REPLACE THE TREATY WITH ANOTHER TREATY. AS THE US SIDE HAD CONCEDED, THIS ASSUMED THAT THE REPLACEMENT TREATY MIGHT BE DIFFERENT, AND THEREFORE MIGHT HAVE A DIFFERENT SCOPE. BUT THE SOVIETS BELIEVED THAT ANY CTB SHOULD HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE SCOPE. THE SOVIETS BELIEVED THERE SHOULD BE A POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING THE CTB AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE, DEPENDING ON THE TESTING OF OTHER STATES NOT PARTY TO THE TREATY. THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS ISSUE.

4. WARNKE RESPONDED BY REMINDING PETROSYANTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD IN EFFECT ALREADY PROPOSED A THREE-YEAR TERM. HE COULD NOT REGARD IT AS A MATTER OF MAJOR CONCERN SINCE IN EITHER CASE WE WOULD BE SEEING WHETHER A TEST BAN REGIME WAS WORKABLE. WE MIGHT HAVE NO REPLACEMENT TREATY,

OR, IF WE DID, IT MIGHT BE IDENTICAL OR THE CHANGE MIGHT BE MINOR LIKE A CHANGE IN THE DURATION. BUT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A PROVISION THAT THE TREATY AUTOMATICALLY EXTEND, BASED ON SOME EVENT NOT OF OUR OWN CHOOSING, LIKE WHAT FRANCE OR CHINA MIGHT DO. WE MIGHT NOT FEEL IT PRUDENT TO RENEW A CTB, EVEN IF FRANCE AND CHINA BECAME PARTIES, FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE HAD SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT STOCKPILE RELIABILITY, WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A NEED

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FOR TESTING. THE MOST COMPELLING REASON FOR A FIXED

PERIOD WITH OPPORTUNITY FOR A REPLACEMENT TREATY WAS POLITICAL. CTB WOULD BE THE CULMINATION OF DECADES OF CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE AND IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO BE ABLE TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE PROBLEM AFTER A FIXED PERIOD.

5. PETROSYANTS RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD FULLY WARNKE'S ARGUMENTS. HOWEVER, POSSIBILITY OF FIVE OR THREE YEARS STILL REMAINED OPEN. PERSONALLY, HE WOULD FAVOR A FIXED PERIOD AND WOULD PREFER FIVE YEARS. HE NEEDED TO REPORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. MUCH DEPENDED ON

THIS ISSUE. WARNKE AGREED, AND SAID WE WOULD OF COURSE INFORM THE SOVIETS WHEN AND IF WE HAD A NEW POSITION WITH REGARD TO DURATION.

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6. ON VERIFICATION, PETROSYANTS SAID THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE REGARDING ON-SITE INSPECTION (OSI) AND A GREAT DEAL OF GOOD WORK HAD BEEN DONE ON RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTORS. AMERICAN SPECIALISTS, HOWEVER, WERE COMPLICATING THE NEGOTIATIONS BY SEEKING TO INCLUDE TOO MUCH DETAIL. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT HE HEARD OPPOSITE COMPLAINTS THAT SOVIET SPECIALISTS WERE TRYING TO MAKE THE PROVISIONS TOO GENERAL AND WERE AVOIDING NECESSARY DETAIL. BOTH PETROSYANTS AND WARNKE THOUGHT THAT THE DELEGATIONS OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO SOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES REGARDING RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS.

7. TURNING TO NSS, PETROSYANTS REVIEWED THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS BELIEVED THAT USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM) WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR VERIFICATION, THEY HAD AGREED TO MORE; AND THEY HAD EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER NSS. BUT IN THE ENTIRE CONCEPT MANY THINGS STILL REMAINED UNCLEAR. SO MANY UNIDENTIFIED EVENTS WOULD BE RECORDED THAT WE MIGHT SHOWER EACH OTHER WITH REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION. THIS WOULD NOT INCREASE CONFIDENCE. THERE WERE QUITE A FEW PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT LOATH TO TRY TO COMPLICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR. HOWEVER, DESPITE ALL THIS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER DETAILED PLANS FOR AN NSS. BUT NO COMPLETE NSS WAS READY TODAY. THERE WOULD JUST BE ONE PROTOTYPE TO BE TESTED LATER. NEITHER THE US NOR THE SOVIET UNION COULD BASE SUCH AN IMPORTANT TREATY AS THE CTB ON SUCH A SITUATION. HOWEVER, PETROSYANTS WAS INTERESTED IN A SOLUTION AND HE WANTED TO PROPOSE WHAT SHOULD NOW BE DONE.

8. IN THE INTEREST OF AGREEMENT, THE USSR WAS READY FOR

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AN EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA WHICH WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN STAGES. IN THE FIRST STAGE, VERIFICATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY NTM, SUPPLEMENTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE (ISDE). TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE WITH TREATY COMPLIANCE, THEY COULD AGREE IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT TO HAVE AN ADDITIONAL EXCHANGE OF

DATA FROM SEISMIC STATIONS, THE NUMBER OF WHICH WOULD BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THE PROCEDURES WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THOSE FOR THE ISDE. IN THE NEXT STAGE THERE WOULD BE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS -- IMPROVED SEISMIC EQUIPMENT WITH AGREED TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, INCLUDING AN AUTHENTICATOR FOR SEISMIC DATA WHICH WOULD ALSO HAVE AGREED CHARACTERISTICS. THIS DATA WOULD BE TRANSMITTED BY MEANS OF MAGNETIC TAPES. ON THE BASIS OF THIS COMPROMISE SOVIET PROPOSAL, WE COULD REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING ON NSS.

9. WARNKE REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF VERIFICATION DISCUSSIONS, RECALLING OUR MAJOR SHIFT TO OSI ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS AS WELL AS OUR SHIFT FROM AN APPROACH OF AUTOMATIC SEISMIC STATIONS TO NATIONAL OR MANNED STATIONS. HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS "ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL" TO AGREE ON A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS. WE COULD DISCUSS WHAT KIND OF STATIONS, HOW MANY, AND WHEN THEY WOULD BE INSTALLED, BUT WITHOUT NSS THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF A CTB BEING ACCEPTED IN THE US. WARNKE EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO WORK TOGETHER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE STATIONS. THIS WOULD BE A COOPERATIVE PROJECT, CONTINUING EVEN AFTER WE SIGNED A CTB. WARNKE TOOK EXCEPTION TO THE ARGUMENT THAT NSS WAS BAD BECAUSE IT WOULD PRODUCE TOO MUCH INFORMATION. INFORMATION WAS GOOD FOR US; THE MORE WE KNEW, THE BETTER, BECAUSE THEN THERE WOULD BE LESS CHANCE OF SUSPICION. WE WOULD NOT ASSUME VIOLATIONS, AND NSS WOULD HELP TO SHOW THAT THE TREATY WAS BEING OBSERVED. WARNKE THEN EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH THE PRESENT TYPE OF NSS WAS NOT IN OPERATION, ITS COMPONENTS HAD BEEN IN OPERATION FOR SECRET

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SOME YEARS. WE WERE COMBINING ESTABLISHED COMPONENTS. SO IT WAS A LITTLE LIKE A NEW CAR MODEL. THERE WAS NO DOUBT IT WAS GOING TO RUN. THE PROGRAM WOULD HAVE STRIN-

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GENT QUALITY CONTROL AND TESTING. EVEN IF THE NSS WAS NOT COMPLETELY READY WHEN WE SIGNED THE TREATY, WE NEEDED AGREEMENT THAT WE WILL HAVE NSS WITH CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND WE SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON HOW THESE WOULD BE PHASED IN. PERHAPS WE ALREADY HAD AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WE NEEDED A FURTHER MEETING OF THE MINDS ON REQUIREMENTS ABOUT THE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF NSS, THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, AND THEIR PHASING. THE GREATER AMOUNT OF INFORMATION FROM NSS WOULD BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THE TREATY.

10. PETROSYANTS RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WARNKE'S ARGUMENTS. THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED VERIFICATION BY OSI AND BY NSS. THE SOVIETS WERE IN FAVOR OF THESE STATIONS, BUT ONLY PERFORMING THE TASKS THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO. OUR EXPERTS SHOULD BE GIVEN FURTHER GUIDANCE ON HOW TO SOLVE
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THIS PROBLEM. WARNKE

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